2026年7月3日金曜日

半分の問題も解くことはできません - ハミルトン・ノーラン著

You Can't Solve Half a Problem - by Hamilton Nolan

You Can't Solve Half a Problem

The moderate's delusion.

(Image: Getty)

Political moderates are those who believe that wisdom begins with the rejection of perfection. It would be nice if the world were the way that we wish it would be, but it’s not going to be that way any time soon, and insisting that it should be is therefore a mark of unseriousness. Incrementalism, they believe, is the adult choice; everything else is utopianism, which is an immature waste of time. The moderates, the centrists, the incrementalists, the adults in the room—all are eager to discard the great leap forward in favor of a modest step in the right direction. In many cases, their embrace of this philosophy is rooted in a genuine belief that it is the best that they, and we, can hope for.

Even if we grant the moderates the benefit of the doubt when it comes to their sincerity, we do not have to grant them anything when it comes to their skills as negotiators. They are masters of bargaining against themselves. Their most reliable move is to cede ground before the battle even starts. While they imagine that picking a more modest starting point marks them as realists, it actually marks them as marks. They give their opponents something for nothing. It is not necessary for the other side to wrestle them as far. If the moderates had had the courage to ask for everything rather than an increment, they would, after all the tussling was over, land closer to where they actually wanted to be. This basic principle of negotiation is clear to anyone who has had to struggle for something they need. But since moderates need nothing, and approach politics with a bias towards stasis rather than progress, they are prone to the pitfall of giving up on political substance in exchange for keeping the struggle itself as genteel as possible.

Another way to say this is that the philosophy of moderates, their approach to politics, only works if the people on the other side are moderates as well. Theirs is a game with intelligible rules played by people who live in horror of being perceived as extremists. When a moderate comes up against someone whose political beliefs are stronger than their beliefs in decorum, the moderates get destroyed. They get yanked towards their opponents position due to their own abhorrence of sweat, of conflict. If moderates had deep ethical beliefs, they would recognize the need to change their strategy when their opponents grew more radical. Sadly, the moderate mind, lulled into paralysis by the air-conditioned air of Washington, DC conference rooms, always seems unable to rouse itself to evolve past the rudimentary epoch of polite political jousting.



Americans today are living in the socioeconomic rubble left by the failure of the incrementalists. The Democratic Party, dazzled by the passing success of Clintonian triangulation theory, has been institutionally unable to recognize that that era has passed, and a new and more brutal period of political war has settled upon us. As a result, we have all been subjected to the humiliating spectacle of mainstream liberal institutionalists harrumphing about norms as an increasingly fascist Republican Party gleefully smashes up all of their hallowed traditions with hammers. The destruction of the Trump era, of course, does not affect the material lives of Democratic political leaders one bit. They suffer only mild chagrin. Regular people pay a higher price.

The thing that Democrats, as a party, have still not yet accepted is that they have to solve the problems. Incrementalism, by definition, solves only part of a problem, which to the regular people who suffer the genuine consequences is the same as not solving the problem. What does this mean, concretely? It means that you need to give people decent health care that they can afford, rather than boasting about taking minor steps down the long road towards that goal. It means that you must give people wages that they can live on, rather than boasting about small economic gains that still leave them too broke. It means that you must attack the power of billionaires until the billionaires do not have too much power any more, rather than advocating for modest tax increases that leave an oligarchy substantially in place. It means you have to expand the Supreme Court and put in term limits and end the antidemocratic unaccountability of the institution, rather than hoping that the inherent robustness of our storied institutions will somehow reassert itself in time to save the day.

The distinction that I’m making here is less ideological than practical. The entire pseudo-civil war inside of the Democratic Party over “socialism” is a canard. Nobody really knows what socialism means, and the policy overlap between the socialists and the “progessives” is significant. What is propelling the popularity of the socialists in certain districts is less an upswell in Marx-reading and more the fact that these candidates are touting both policy positions and a fighting attitude that would solve the problems of the people. Medicare for All solves a problem; incremental improvements to Obamacare do not. Aggressive wealth taxes combined with aggressive promotion of mass unionization solve a problem; minor tax increases on the rich and “business and workers can thrive together” platitudes do not. Expanding the Supreme Court and imposing term limits on justices solves a problem; calling on the next Democratic president to appoint someone liberal does not. This list can go on and on and on. The point is that in each of these cases, the left-most position is the one that would actually make a significant positive material impact on the macro-level problem, whereas the incremental approach would mitigate the underlying problem to such a small extent that the average person could be forgiven for not perceiving the change at all. Instead of thinking of the differing approaches to these issues on a left-to-right or radical-to-conservative axis, it can be helpful sometimes to just ask: “What would it take to actually solve this problem, as opposed to just moving somewhat in the right direction on it?”


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The ultimate failure of the moderates is that the thing they prize the most—their savvy realism—is a big illusion. When the reality of life is extreme, the radicals are the realists. They are the ones trying to bring about a change appropriate to the severity of the problem. This is not quite a perfect metaphor, but when I think of political centrists, I often imagine a person dying of thirst in the desert who finally crawls up to a stand selling bottles of water.

MAN DYING OF THIRST: A liter of water, please.
VENDOR: Sorry, we only sell two-liter bottles.
MAN DYING OF THIRST: Well, forget it then. That would be too much. [dies]

Institutionalists who imagine that they are playing a civilized game with honorable peers are neither savvy nor realistic when they are actually facing religious zealots, corrupt strongmen, gutter racists, and fascists whose goal is to crush their opposition by any means. Achieving your political ends means, first, accurately assessing who your opposition is and what it will take to overcome them. That assessment will naturally lead you to more radical measures as your opponents themselves grow more vicious. An unwillingness to accept this will leave you impotent, as today’s Democratic Party institutionalists are.

Taxing Elon Musk’s wealth from a trillion dollars to $900 billion will not alter the fact that a small handful of ultra-rich oligarchs hold wealth and power that exceeds that of the majority of America’s citizens combined. No. You need to relocate enough wealth and power from the oligarchs to the public that the underlying problem is solved. What is the point of saying “We’ll start with a little, and then down the road we’ll get more”? You’ll never get more. You will get beaten, because you did not attack your opponent with enough force to stop him from coming back and beating you. Moderates seem not to comprehend that it takes roughly the same amount of political capital to do a little bit of good as it takes to do a lot of good. It is almost as hard to raise taxes on billionaires by 5% as it is to raise taxes on them by 90%, because it is the direction that generates the opposition, more than the magnitude. Billionaires are going to fight against you raising their taxes, period. If you’re going to have the fight, it might as well be over a change that would, if you win, solve the problem. Moderates are shocked when they can’t mobilize Americans over policies that would not meaningfully change their lives for the better. This is, frankly, stupid.

Assess our economic and social and political problems honestly. Decide what measures are necessary to solve those problems. Then fight for those measures. Do not cut your request in half before you begin to fight, due to your mistaken belief that this will make winning your fight more realistic. It won’t. Your fight will be just as hard and even if you win you still lose and the public won’t be happy either way because the problems are still there. There is no such thing as solving half a problem. You solve it, or you don’t. If you’re not willing to go all the way then you are in favor of keeping the problems in place. This is all common sense, if you haven’t been deluding yourself for too long.

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  • Related reading: How to Think About Politics Without Wanting to Kill Yourself; Confiscate Their Money; What Is Centrism?

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2026年7月1日水曜日

原典に当たるMMT——続きの続き。MMTとは「変動相場制で自国通貨建ての国債だけを発行している国」の話ではない|wankonyankoricky

原典に当たるMMT——続きの続き。MMTとは「変動相場制で自国通貨建ての国債だけを発行している国」の話ではない|wankonyankoricky

原典に当たるMMT——続きの続き。MMTとは「変動相場制で自国通貨建ての国債だけを発行している国」の話ではない

Bond sales (or purchases) by the treasury and central bank are, then, ultimately triggered by deviation of reserves from the position desired (or
required) by the banking system, which causes the overnight rate to move away from target (if it is above zero). Bond sales by either the central bank
or the treasury are properly seen as part of monetary policy designed to allow the central bank to hit its target. This target is exogenously 'administered' by the central bank. Obviously, the central bank sets its target as a result of its belief about the impact of this rate on a range of economic variables that are included in its policy objectives. In other words, setting of this rate 'exogenously' does not imply that the central bank is oblivious to the economic and political constraints it believes to reign (whether these constraints and relationships actually exist is a different matter). But, as Moore insists, the overnight rate can be taken as exogenous.
 This discussion applies to nations in which the government issues a currency in a floating exchange rate regime. A country that pegs its currency to a foreign currency or precious metal operates in a quite different interest rate environment, however, generating constraints on both fiscal and monetary policy. If a government promises to redeem its currency for another currency, or for a precious metal, it must retain sufficient reserves of that currency or metal to meet all conceivable requests for conversion. This could require reserves equal to, or even greater than, the total stock of domestic high powered money (plus the portion of government bonds that is maturing in the near-term). Government budget deficits are then quite dangerous unless a trade surplus can keep the foreign currencies, or precious metals, flowing into official reserves. More relevantly for this chapter, interest rates become endogenous in the sense that monetary policy must discourage redemption of domestic currency assets for foreign currency or precious metal. Further, a looser fiscal policy must almost necessarily be offset by a tighter monetary policy (higher rate target) unless the country enjoys a sufficient trade surplus. If private banks offer convertible accounts, they must also retain sufficient reserves to meet conversions. Note also that central bank policy will tighten in crisis, just as the Bank of England used to raise rates and call in loans whenever there was a run on private banks during the nineteenth century (Wray, 1990). Accommodative behavior of the central bank operating in a fixed exchange rate regime is dangerous because it places the country's reserves of foreign currency or metal at risk. Thus, the Fed's timid response to the Great Depression, and its raising of rates in the accompanying financial crisis, were appropriate while the country was on the gold standard. While the Fed did still 'administer' the discount rate in a technical sense, it could not 'exogenously control' it because international financial markets dictated the domestic rate that would stem specie outflow.

前出・続き

 したがって、財務省や中央銀行による債券の売却(あるいは購入)は、最終的には、準備残高が銀行システムが望む(あるいは必要とする)水準からの乖離し、それが翌日物金利を目標値(ゼロより高い場合)から引き離すことで、引き金を引かれる。中央銀行または財務省による債券売却は、中央銀行が目標を達成できるように設計された金融政策の一環としてとらえることが適切である。この目標は、中央銀行によって外生的に「管理」される。当然のことながら、中央銀行は、政策目標に含まれる一連の経済変数に対するこの金利の影響に関する見解に基づき、目標を設定する。言い換えれば、この金利を「外生的に」設定するからといって、中央銀行が、自らが支配的であると見なす経済的・政治的制約を無視しているわけではない(これらの制約や関係が実際に存在するかどうかは別問題である)。しかし、ムーアが主張するように、オーバーナイト金利は外生的であると見なすことができる。
 この議論は、政府が変動為替相場制の下で通貨を発行している国々に当てはまる。しかし、自国通貨を外国通貨や貴金属にペッグしている国はまったく異なる金利環境下で運営されており、財政政策と金融政策の両方に制約を作り出している。政府が自国通貨を別の通貨や貴金属と交換することを約束する場合、想定しうるすべての交換要求に応えられるよう、その通貨または貴金属の十分な準備高を確保しなければならない。これにより、国内のハイパワードマネー(および短期で満期を迎える国債の部分)の総残高に匹敵する、あるいはそれを上回る準備高が必要となる可能性がある。したがって貿易黒字によって外貨や貴金属が公的準備に流入し続けられない限り、政府の財政赤字は極めて危険なものとなる。本章にとってより重要な点は、金融政策としては、自国通貨建資産を外貨や貴金属へ換金されることを抑制しなければならない、その意味で金利が内生的になるのである。さらに十分な貿易黒字を享受していない限り、緩和的な財政政策は、ほぼ必然的に引き締め的な金融政策(金利目標の上方修正)によって相殺されなければならない。民間銀行が換金可能な口座を提供する場合には、これまた換金要求に応えるために十分な準備を保有しなければならない。また、危機時には中央銀行の政策が引き締められる点にも留意すべきである。これは19世紀に民間銀行で取り付け騒ぎが発生するたびに、イングランド銀行が金利を引き上げ、貸付金の回収を行っていたのと同様である(Wray, 1990)。固定為替相場制下で中央銀行がアコモデート的な行動をとることは、その国の外貨や貴金属の準備をリスクにさらすため、危険である。したがって、大恐慌に対する連銀の消極的な対応や、それに伴う金融危機における利上げは、米国が金本位制下にあった当時においては適切な措置であった。連銀は技術的な意味では依然として割引率を「管理」していたものの、国際金融市場が正貨流出を食い止めるための国内金利を決定していたため、それを「外生的に制御」することはできなかった。

DeepLの訳を修正

 さて、「MMTは変動相場制で自国通貨を発行し、自国通貨建て国債のみを発行している国に当てはまる」という言説を聞いたことがある人は多いのではないか。だがここでレイが語っているのは、固定相場制あるいは金本位制のもとでの金融財政政策の一面である。
 ホリゼンタリストの代表者として、ムーアは現に目の前で行われているオペレーション手続きを適切に評価した。翌日物金利は中央銀行が決定し、管理している。その「管理」は、中央銀行が参照する資料に基づくものだ。しかし歴史的に言えば、これは「変動相場制で自国通貨を発行している」国にしか、当てはまらない。ここでムーアは「administration」と「control」を不離として語っている。両者を区別することには意味がないかのようだ。だが変動相場制ではない国々——例えばユーロ圏のような——は、いったいどうだろうか。
 資本制経済——貨幣的生産経済——においては、金本位制だろうと外貨ペッグ制だろうと、すべての国で中央銀行は金利を「アドミニストレート」している。今回はこの言葉に「管理」という訳語を当てた。しかし「コントロール」——今回は「制御」とした——は外生的である。つまり「金本位制あるいは外貨ペッグ制を維持する」という方向を見ながら、金利を決定しなければならない。変動相場制だろうと金本位制だろうと、中央銀行は金利を「管理」しているのである。だが中央銀行は何を見て、何を優先して金利を決定するのか。「外貨・金地金との交換」を約束している債券——それが国債であろうと紙幣であろうと——を発行している国家の中央銀行は、約束の不履行が生じないように配慮して金利を決定する。この場合には、実際に「国家債券の債務不履行」、つまり「約束通りのもので約束の期日に払い戻しができない」事態は生じるのである。これはインフレデフレとはまた全く別の話である。MMTが、「インフレ」を「実質的な財政破綻」とは区別して考えている、ということについてはすでに説明したが、実際「インフレ」と「国家債務の不履行」とは全く原因を異にする全く別の経済現象なのであり、その問題解決手法も全く異なっている。金本位制を離脱し、変動相場制になったことで、問題の一つは解決された。これで「自国通貨」が経済的理由でデフォルトする必然性はなくなった。ところが中には共通通貨に戻って昔の問題を繰り返す国々もあるし、自国通貨価値を高めようとして一時的な利益のために外貨とペッグしてしまい、結局自国通貨の「主権性」を放棄する国も出てきている。MMTはこうした政策に関する「べからず帳」を提供しているのであって、決して「『変動相場制』だけに適用される理論」などではない。ただ政策論的には「変動相場制を採用するべきではない」「外貨建て国債を発行するべきではない」ということになる。だがMMT自体は政策論でも「べき」論でもない。ただ、「である」ことをどう記述するか、という話だ。ウエーバーの「ザイン」と「ゾルレン」の違いである。今日、ウエーバーは流行っていないようだが、後にインガムからの引用も取り扱うつもりなので(そこではマルクスやケインズ、シュンペーター、ヴェブレンと並んでウエーバーも取り扱われているので)、興味ある方は『プロ倫』を中心に、岩波文庫から出ているものぐらいには今のうちに一通り目を通しておいてほしい。おっと、これは鬼が笑うか。いや、話がまたずれた。
 
 だから「MMTは変動相場制の自国通貨を発行している国にだけ当てはまる」という言い方をされることは、まじめにMMTを学んでいる人間にとっては大変迷惑な話なのである。変動相場制ではなく、あるいは自国通貨を発行していない国にも、外貨建て国債を発行している国々にも、MMTは当てはまる。ただ、そういう国々には国債や通貨のデフォルトの経済金融的必然性はあり得るし、それを避けるために中央銀行は、国内の経済状況を無視して——考慮していたところで結果はあまり関係ないかもしれない、というのがMMTのまた別の論点ではあるが――、現物金や外貨の流出入を最優先して、金利を決定せざるを得なくなるかもしれない、ということである。

猫のしっぽを踏んでしまったので、途中だが今日は終わり。本論文からの引用はとりあえずここでおしまい。

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