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クララ・マッテイ Clara Mattei How Economists Invented Austerity & Paved the Way to Fascism
AUSTERITY, I WOULD LIKE TO SAY, IS MORE THAN JUST POLICY. IT'S ALSO THE THEORY JUSTIFYING THE POLICY. AND, OF COURSE, THE THEORY CAME OUT IN DIRECT OPPOSITION TO A THEORY THAT WAS INSTEAD TRYING TO EMPOWER THE WORKERS.
-CLARA MATTEI
緊縮財政は単なる政策ではありません。政策を正当化する理論でもあるのです。そしてもちろん、その理論は、労働者に力を与えようとする理論に真っ向から対立する形で出てきました。-CLARA MATTEI
クララ・マテイ How Economists Invented Austerity & Paved the Way to Fascism
https://youtu.be/ofFR1mD2UOM
2022/10/13
- It is at this point that you see how economic theory understood as a framework that expels class conflict, expels the worker as the source of value, and instead tells us that the economy is made up of individuals, it's no longer the worker who counts, but it's the entrepreneur who's the driver of the economic machine, it's there that this economic theory that seems so apolitical is actually justifying the most classist set of economic policies of all. Hi, everyone, my name is Clara Mattei. I'm assistant professor of economics at The New School for Social Research. And my work focuses on the relation between economic theory and policy making. So, an interdisciplinary work that is both history of economic thought and economic history, as well as methodology of economics. So, austerity has been so widely successful in shaping our societies and how we think about our society. It has been fundamentally undetectable. It is so normalized that we rarely call it by name. But it actually informs all the common tropes of contemporary policy making, from the budget cuts, specifically in welfare cuts, such as public spending for schools, for universities, for healthcare, for housing, unemployment benefits, regressive taxation, so we constantly see cuts in the highest brackets or cuts in corporate taxes, and also hikes in the interest rates, which is, of course, something that we're seeing the Fed is undertaking at the present moment. What I try to do in my work is re-problematize austerity. Austerity is everywhere. It's all-encompassing in our lives. Yet, I don't think that scholars have thoroughly been able to pinpoint why austerity is so successful and so enduring in contemporary capitalism. I wrote this book that took many years and it's coming out with Chicago University Press beginning of November. The book is called "The Capital Order: How Economists Invented Austerity and Paved the Way to Fascism." What I tried to do in this book is rethink austerity, rethink it in fundamentally three ways. The first is to avoid considering austerity just as a matter of fiscal measures. So it's not just about cuts in the budget. It's something more. It's what I call the austerity trinity, which includes the mutual operation of fiscal policies, so, of course, both on the side of cutting and on the side of the income through regressive taxation, monetary policy, so, interest rates hikes, and industrial policies. And when I talk about industrial policies, what I fundamentally mean is the fact that there is a permanent attack on organized labor, which can be cutting union benefits, curtailing the role of the unions, but also, fundamentally securing wage flexibility and wage repression. So, this austerity trinity works in unison, and you cannot just focus on one aspect. Moreover, what I try to say is that austerity is actually not just policy. It's more. It's actually the amalgamation of policy and theory. And austerity is in fact very successful because it has a powerful set of theory backing it. So this is the first main claim, what austerity is. It's both policy, not just fiscal policy, and it's also theory. And theory and policy cannot be separable. Secondly, austerity is not the product of the so-called neo-liberal era of the 1970s. Austerity is actually quite more fundamental to the operation of capitalism. And its origin dates back to at least the beginning of the century, and my claim is that austerity finds its origins after the Great War, so after 1918. And it was a measure to react to a big crisis of capitalism. So austerity as the mainstay of capitalism, not just an exception, but quite the norm. And at this point, the third claim I make is that austerity is not just a matter of irrationality, of bad economic theory that thus informs a mistaken policy. And this is the reading of austerity that many Keynesians have, but I think it's very simplistic. Because it does not really get to why, then, does austerity persist? And to really fundamentally understand why austerity persists, we need to figure out its deeper logic. And this deeper logic is understandable if we think about austerity not as stabilizing economies necessarily, right. The reason why Mark Blyth calls austerity madness, it's because it has never really or very exceptionally achieved its stated goals of economic growth and debt repayment, right? So the tale of expansionary austerity is certainly one that economists espouse but has been often, actually, disproven by historical events. So, as I was saying, austerity is not necessarily successful in stabilizing economies, but it is successful in something deeper. And my bold claim in the book is that austerity was really never about the end goal of curtailing inflation and balanced budgets. These were means to a greater end, which is that of preserving the capital order. So austerity may not stabilize the economy, but stabilizes what is actually the precondition for any capital accumulation and any preservation of our socioeconomic system as a whole, which is capital. That comes from, that's the title's motivation is the capital order, what is the capital order? It is the idea that capital is not merely a commodity. So money invested to make more money. But it's actually presupposes a specific social relation of production, a specific class relation that requires stabilization. If you don't secure the preservation of this class relation that is at the foundation of economic growth under capitalism, then the system may be in crisis. So the book explores the origin of austerity because I believe that in order to understand the logic of austerity still today, you need to really go back. After the first World War, something unimaginable happened for the people living at that time. Capitalism was shaken at its very core. The pillars of capitalism, what guarantees capital accumulation, which is private property of the means of production and wage relations, so capital as a class relation, were shaken. Why were they shaken? Well, because there had been a massive shock in the relation between the state and the market. The Great War, the first World War, was a moment in which the state, in order to guarantee economic victory, had to cross the natural boundaries of what it was normally meant to do. The state became the main employer, the main producer, and actually the main regulator of the labor force. In this way, what used to be understood as natural givens, private property of the means of production and wage relations, were all of a sudden re-politicized. What do I mean by this? Seems like a big word, but it's actually quite simple. Workers and the majority of citizens in Europe, and I focus specifically on Britain and Italy, and I will tell you why more later, started realizing that things could be different. We could be living in a different socioeconomic order. Capitalism was not a natural given. It was a specific classist political choice in which the state was directly visibly intervening to coerce the workers into greater exploitation in order to win the war. So after the first World War, and this is what I discuss in the first part of the book, the crisis of capitalism, this crisis was not just about an economic downturn, was something much more. It was about calls for economic democracy, calls to overcome capital as a class relation, calls to actually regain sovereignty as producers and fundamentally abolish the profit motive and the private property of the means of production. How did this happen? It happened in many ways. It happened through guild socialism, through worker council movements. I go through a whole spectrum of practical possibilities for change that were also informed by different economic theory. So Marxian economic theory that put at the center stage the worker. So what happens there? And this is, we get to the crux of the matter. In a moment in which capitalism was shaking, in which there was deep uncertainty for the future, the sense of contingency was everywhere, not just from the side of the workers, especially from the side of the bourgeoisie, who was really frightened on the news and on the press about the possible collapse of the socioeconomic order. And this is very clear also in Keynes' writing in 1919. This is when austerity is really born. Austerity is born as a tool of reaction to prevent the collapse of capitalism as a classist socioeconomic system. So, austerity is really a political project that was extremely successful in preventing, foreclosing alternatives to capitalism. And how did that happen? Well, I reconstruct the first international financial conferences in Brussels and Genoa, 1919, 1922, in which experts, economists, for the first time, were called to advise states all over Europe and to tell them what was the true economic doctrine that should be implemented in order to prevent the collapse. And this is the big relationship between austerity and technocracy. Technocracy, meaning the rule of economic experts in advising governments, but more than this, technocracy as an epistemic stance by which experts can come up with theories that are above classist, that are neutral, objective, without any sort of bias, and thus, the expert as the guide to the solution and to the prosperity of all. So, very much apolitical theory, and of course, this was grounded in the growing marginalist framework. The original of neoclassical economics that still dominates to this day is really dated at the end of the 19th century, but was really kind of spreading and becoming ingrained in the years of the birth of austerity, in the 1920s. So it is at this point that you see how economic theory understood as a framework that expels class conflict, expels the worker as the source of value, and instead tells us that the economy is made up of individuals that are not in conflict with one another, but they're actually in harmony, and that it's no longer the worker who counts, but it's the entrepreneur who is the driver of the economic machine, it's there that this economic theory that seems so apolitical is actually justifying the most classist set of economic policies of all. And again, we need this theory that in its classless guise is able to justify policies, the trinity, the austerity trinity of fiscal, monetary, industrial austerity, that served to crush the voice of the workers in a very material way. So austerity as a tool, as a political project, that is at once about constructing consensus for the capitalist order through mainstream economic theory that justifies the priority of the saving investing elite as the real engine of the economic machine, that thus should be incentivized, and austerity as coercion through these policies that in fact, austerity policies are nothing but the shifting of resources from the majority that at that time was empowered. Wage shares were very high after the war. The Red Biennium, 1918 to 1920, in which the workers were raising their voices, not just for higher wages, but for a really different socioeconomic order. Austerity serves to disempower them materially speaking. And how does this happen? Well, either directly through policies that actually make strikes illegal, such as in Italy, and curtail wages, and this is what happens under Mussolini's Italy, but also indirectly by creating an economic downturn. So, monetary deflation, what we see actually being the main policy agenda now of the Fed, monetary deflation together with budget cuts have also, the indirect effect, that very important indirect effect of slowing down the economy, creating higher unemployment, which, of course, kills the bargaining power of the workers and thus, subordinates them in a coercive way into accepting the capital order. So we see how there's a direct and indirect shift of resources and of political power from the majority to the minority. And in this, austerity is successful and it has, what I tried to show in the book is that, the origin story only really makes more explicit, given that it is a moment in which everyone recognizes class conflict as the driving feature of the historical moment, makes only more explicit what is more nuanced and hidden today. So this is why we need to take history seriously is that if you understand the moment in which austerity was born, you can really figure out its logic.
- この時点で、階級闘争を追放し、価値の源泉としての労働者を追放する枠組みとして経済理論がどのように理解されているかがわかります、しかし、経済機械の原動力は起業家です。非常に非政治的に見えるこの経済理論が、実際にはすべての経済政策の中で最も階級主義的なセットを正当化しているのです。
こんにちは、クララ・マッテイです。私はニュースクール フォー ソーシャル リサーチの経済学助教授です。私の研究は、経済理論と政策決定との関係に焦点を当てています。つまり、経済思想史と経済史の両方であり、経済学の方法論でもある学際的な作品です。そう、緊縮財政は、私たちの社会を形成し、私たちの社会についてどのように考えるかに非常に広く成功しています. それは基本的に検出されませんでした。それは非常に正規化されているため、名前で呼ぶことはめったにありません。しかし、それは実際には、予算削減、特に学校、大学、医療、住宅、失業給付、逆進課税などの公共支出などの福祉削減から、現代の政策決定のすべての一般的な比喩を伝えています。法人税の最高額または引き下げ、そして金利の引き上げももちろんありますが、これはもちろん、FRBが現在取り組んでいることです。私が仕事でやろうとしていることは、緊縮財政を再問題化することです. 緊縮はどこにでもあります。それは私たちの生活のすべてを網羅しています。それでも、私はしません 現代の資本主義において緊縮がこれほどまでに成功し、持続している理由を、学者たちは徹底的に突き止めてきたと思います。私はこの本を何年もかけて書き、シカゴ大学出版局から 11 月初めに出版されます。この本のタイトルは「The Capital Order: How Economists Invented Austerity and Paved the Way to Fascism.」です。この本で私がやろうとしたことは、緊縮財政を根本的に3つの方法で再考することです.
1つ目は、緊縮財政を単に財政措置の問題として考えないようにすることです。ですから、予算の削減だけではありません。それはもっと何かです。それは私が緊縮財政の三位一体と呼んでいるものであり、財政政策の相互運用を含み、もちろん、削減の側面と、逆進課税、金融政策、つまり金利の上昇、そして産業政策。そして、私が産業政策について話すとき、私が基本的に言いたいのは、組織化された労働に対する恒久的な攻撃があるという事実です。これは、組合の利益を削減し、組合の役割を削減するだけでなく、賃金の柔軟性と賃金の抑圧を根本的に確保する可能性があります。したがって、この緊縮の三位一体は調和して機能し、1 つの側面だけに集中することはできません。
さらに、私が言おうとしているのは、緊縮は実際には単なる政策ではないということです。もっとです。それは実際には政策と理論の融合です。緊縮財政は、それを裏付ける一連の強力な理論を持っているため、実際には非常に成功しています。これが最初の主要な主張であり、緊縮とは何かです。それは財政政策だけでなく政策でもあり、理論でもあります。そして、理論と政策は切り離すことはできません。
第二に、緊縮財政は、1970 年代のいわゆる新自由主義時代の産物ではありません。実際、緊縮財政は資本主義の運営にとってより根本的なものです。そして、その起源は少なくとも世紀の初めにまでさかのぼります。私の主張は、緊縮財政は第一次世界大戦後、つまり 1918 年以降にその起源を見つけたということです。そして、それは資本主義の大きな危機に対処するための手段でした。資本主義の柱としての緊縮財政は、単なる例外ではなく、ごく普通のことです。
そしてこの時点で、私が主張する 3 つ目の主張は、緊縮は単なる不合理の問題ではなく、誤った政策を知らせる悪い経済理論の問題ではないということです。そして、これは多くのケインジアンが持っている緊縮財政の読み方ですが、非常に単純化されていると思います。では、緊縮財政が続く理由がよくわからないのでしょうか。緊縮財政が続く理由を根本的に理解するには そのより深い論理を理解する必要があります。そして、このより深い論理は、緊縮財政が必ずしも経済を安定させるものではないと考えれば理解できます。マーク・ブライスが緊縮財政を狂気と呼ぶ理由は、経済成長と債務返済という宣言された目標を実際に、または非常に例外的に達成したことがないからですよね? したがって、拡張緊縮の話は確かに経済学者が支持するものですが、実際には、歴史的な出来事によってしばしば反証されてきました. ですから、私が言ったように、緊縮は必ずしも経済の安定化に成功するとは限りませんが、より深い何かには成功します。そして本書での私の大胆な主張は、緊縮財政は実際にはインフレの抑制とバランスの取れた予算の最終目標ではなかったということです. これらは、資本秩序を維持するというより大きな目的のための手段でした。したがって、緊縮財政は経済を安定させないかもしれませんが、資本蓄積と社会経済システム全体の維持の実際の前提条件である資本を安定させます。それは、タイトルの動機が資本命令であることに由来していますが、資本命令とは何ですか？資本は単なる商品ではないという考えです。そのため、お金はより多くのお金を稼ぐために投資されました。しかし実際には、生産の特定の社会的関係、安定化を必要とする特定の階級関係を前提としています。資本主義の経済成長の根底にあるこの階級関係の維持を確保しなければ、システムは危機に瀕するかもしれません。
この本は、緊縮財政の起源を探求しています。今日でも緊縮財政の論理を理解するためには、実際に遡る必要があると私は信じているからです。第一次世界大戦後、当時の人々には想像を絶する出来事が起こりました。資本主義は根底から揺さぶられました。生産手段と賃金関係の私有財産である資本蓄積を保証する資本主義の柱、つまり階級関係としての資本が揺さぶられた。なぜ彼らは動揺したのですか？まあ、国家と市場の関係に大きなショックがあったからです。第一次世界大戦である第一次世界大戦は、国家が経済的勝利を保証するために、通常行うべきことの自然な境界を越えなければならなかった瞬間でした. 国家は、主要な雇用者、主要な生産者、そして実際には労働力の主要な規制者になりました。このように、生産手段と賃金関係の自然所与、私有財産として理解されていたものは、突然再政治化されました。これはどういう意味ですか？大きな言葉のように見えますが、実はとてもシンプルです。ヨーロッパの労働者と大多数の市民、特にイギリスとイタリアに焦点を当てています。私たちは異なる社会経済的秩序に住んでいる可能性があります。資本主義は自然に与えられたものではありませんでした。それは、戦争に勝つために、国家が労働者により大きな搾取を強制するために、目に見えて直接介入する、特定の階級差別主義者の政治的選択でした。第一次世界大戦後、本書の最初の部分で論じたのは、資本主義の危機であり、この危機は経済の低迷だけではなく、それ以上のものでした。それは、経済民主主義への呼びかけ、階級関係としての資本の克服への呼びかけ、生産者としての主権を実際に取り戻し、利益の動機と生産手段の私有財産を根本的に廃止することを求めます。どうしてそうなった？それは多くの点で起こりました。それはギルド社会主義を通して、労働者評議会の動きを通して起こりました。私は、さまざまな経済理論からも知らされた、変化の実際的な可能性の全範囲を調べています。つまり、労働者を中心に置いたマルクスの経済理論です。それで何が起こるのですか？そして、これが問題の核心に到達するということです。資本主義が動揺し、将来への深い不確実性があった瞬間に、労働者の側だけでなく、ニュースで本当におびえたブルジョアジーの側から、不測の事態の感覚がいたるところにありましたそして、社会経済秩序の崩壊の可能性についてマスコミで。
これは、1919 年のケインズの著作でも非常に明確です。緊縮財政が実際に生まれるのはこのときです。緊縮財政は、階級差別的な社会経済システムとしての資本主義の崩壊を防ぐための反動のツールとして生まれます。つまり、緊縮財政は、資本主義に代わるものを阻止し、排除することに非常に成功した政治的プロジェクトです。そして、それはどのように起こりましたか？
さて、1919 年と 1922 年にブリュッセルとジェノバで開催された最初の国際金融会議を再構成します。そこでは、専門家や経済学者が初めて召集され、ヨーロッパ中の国々に助言を与え、彼らに、あるべき真の経済学説とは何かを伝えました。崩壊を防ぐために実装されました。そして、これが緊縮財政とテクノクラシーの大きな関係です。政府に助言する経済専門家のルールを意味するテクノクラシーですが、それ以上に、テクノクラシーは、専門家が階級差別を超えた、中立的で、客観的で、偏見のない理論を思いつくことができる認識論的立場として、したがって、専門家は解決策とすべての繁栄へのガイドとしての役割を果たします。したがって、非常に非政治的な理論であり、もちろん、これは成長する限界主義の枠組みに基づいていました。
今日に至るまで支配的な新古典派経済学のオリジナルは、実際には 19 世紀末にさかのぼりますが、緊縮財政が誕生した 1920 年代に広まり、根付きました。この時点で、階級闘争を追放し、価値の源泉としての労働者を追放し、代わりに、経済は互いに対立していない個人で構成されていると私たちに告げる枠組みとして経済理論がどのように理解されたかがわかります。 、 だけどあの人達' 実際には調和が取れており、重要なのはもはや労働者ではなく、経済機械の原動力となっているのは起業家であるということです。非常に非政治的なように見えるこの経済理論は、実際にはすべての経済政策の中で最も階級主義的なセットを正当化しているのです。 . 繰り返しになりますが、私たちはこの理論を必要としています。この理論は、その階級のない装いで、非常に物質的な方法で労働者の声を押しつぶすのに役立った、財政、金融、産業の緊縮という三位一体の緊縮政策を正当化できるというものです。緊縮財政はツールとして、政治的プロジェクトとして、同時に主流の経済理論を通じて資本主義秩序のためのコンセンサスを構築するためのものであり、経済機械の真のエンジンとしての貯蓄投資エリートの優先順位を正当化するものであり、したがって、それは奨励されるべきです。そして、これらの政策による強制としての緊縮財政は、実際、緊縮財政政策は、当時権限を与えられていた多数派からの資源の移動に他ならない. 戦後、賃金シェアは非常に高かった。
1918 年から 1920 年にかけてのレッド ビエンニアムでは、労働者が声を上げていました。それは、賃金の引き上げだけでなく、まったく異なる社会経済秩序を求めるものでした。緊縮財政は、物質的に言えば、彼らを無力化するのに役立ちます。そして、これはどのように起こりますか？そうですね、イタリアのようにストライキを実際に違法にする政策を通じて直接的に賃金を削減するか、これがムッソリーニのイタリアの下で起こっていることですが、景気後退を引き起こすことによって間接的にも起こります。つまり、金融デフレは、FRBの現在の主要な政策課題であると私たちが実際に見ているものであり、予算削減と合わせて金融デフレも間接的な影響を及ぼします。経済を減速させ、より高い失業率を生み出すという非常に重要な間接的影響は、もちろん、労働者の交渉力を殺し、資本秩序を受け入れるよう強制的な方法で労働者を従属させます。このように、多数派から少数派への資源と政治権力の直接的および間接的なシフトがどのように起こっているかがわかります。この中で緊縮財政は成功しており、私が本で示そうとしたことは、起源の物語は、階級闘争が歴史の原動力として誰もが認識する瞬間であることを考えると、実際にはより明確になるだけだということです.瞬間、今日より微妙で隠されているものをより明確にするだけです. ですから、歴史を真剣に受け止める必要があるのは、緊縮財政が生まれた瞬間を理解すれば、その論理を本当に理解できるからです。より高い失業率を生み出し、それはもちろん労働者の交渉力を殺し、強制的な方法で資本命令を受け入れるように彼らを従属させます。このように、多数派から少数派への資源と政治権力の直接的および間接的なシフトがどのように起こっているかがわかります。
この中で緊縮財政は成功しており、私が本で示そうとしたことは、起源の物語は、階級闘争が歴史の原動力として誰もが認識する瞬間であることを考えると、実際にはより明確になるだけだということです.瞬間、今日より微妙で隠されているものをより明確にするだけです. ですから、歴史を真剣に受け止める必要があるのは、緊縮財政が生まれた瞬間を理解すれば、その論理を本当に理解できるからです。より高い失業率を生み出し、それはもちろん労働者の交渉力を殺し、強制的な方法で資本命令を受け入れるように彼らを従属させます。このように、多数派から少数派への資源と政治権力の直接的および間接的なシフトがどのように起こっているかがわかります。この中で緊縮財政は成功しており、私が本で示そうとしたことは、起源の物語は、階級闘争が歴史の原動力として誰もが認識する瞬間であることを考えると、実際にはより明確になるだけだということです.瞬間、今日より微妙で隠されているものをより明確にするだけです. ですから、歴史を真剣に受け止める必要があるのは、緊縮財政が生まれた瞬間を理解すれば、その論理を本当に理解できるからです。資本命令を受け入れるように強制的な方法で彼らを従属させます。
このように、多数派から少数派への資源と政治権力の直接的および間接的なシフトがどのように起こっているかがわかります。この中で緊縮財政は成功しており、私が本で示そうとしたことは、起源の物語は、階級闘争が歴史の原動力として誰もが認識する瞬間であることを考えると、実際にはより明確になるだけだということです.瞬間、今日より微妙で隠されているものをより明確にするだけです. ですから、歴史を真剣に受け止める必要があるのは、緊縮財政が生まれた瞬間を理解すれば、その論理を本当に理解できるからです。資本命令を受け入れるように強制的な方法で彼らを従属させます。このように、多数派から少数派への資源と政治権力の直接的および間接的なシフトがどのように起こっているかがわかります。この中で緊縮財政は成功しており、私が本で示そうとしたことは、起源の物語は、階級闘争が歴史の原動力として誰もが認識する瞬間であることを考えると、実際にはより明確になるだけだということです.瞬間、今日より微妙で隠されているものをより明確にするだけです. ですから、歴史を真剣に受け止める必要があるのは、緊縮財政が生まれた瞬間を理解すれば、その論理を本当に理解できるからです。
つまり、多数派から少数派への資源と政治権力の直接的および間接的なシフトです。この中で緊縮財政は成功しており、私が本で示そうとしたことは、起源の物語は、階級闘争が歴史の原動力として誰もが認識する瞬間であることを考えると、実際にはより明確になるだけだということです.瞬間、今日より微妙で隠されているものをより明確にするだけです. ですから、歴史を真剣に受け止める必要があるのは、緊縮財政が生まれた瞬間を理解すれば、その論理を本当に理解できるからです。つまり、多数派から少数派への資源と政治権力の直接的および間接的なシフトです。
この中で緊縮財政は成功しており、私が本で示そうとしたことは、起源の物語は、階級闘争が歴史の原動力として誰もが認識する瞬間であることを考えると、実際にはより明確になるだけだということです.瞬間、今日より微妙で隠されているものをより明確にするだけです. ですから、歴史を真剣に受け止める必要があるのは、緊縮財政が生まれた瞬間を理解すれば、その論理を本当に理解できるからです。今日、より微妙で隠されているものをより明確にするだけです。ですから、歴史を真剣に受け止める必要があるのは、緊縮財政が生まれた瞬間を理解すれば、その論理を本当に理解できるからです。今日、より微妙で隠されているものをより明確にするだけです。ですから、歴史を真剣に受け止める必要があるのは、緊縮財政が生まれた瞬間を理解すれば、その論理を本当に理解できるからです。
0:00- It is at this point that you see how economic theory
0:04understood as a framework that expels class conflict,
0:10expels the worker as the source of value,
0:15and instead tells us that the economy
0:18is made up of individuals,
0:20it's no longer the worker who counts,
0:22but it's the entrepreneur who's the driver
0:25of the economic machine,
0:26it's there that this economic theory
0:29that seems so apolitical is actually justifying
0:33the most classist set of economic policies of all.
0:40Hi, everyone, my name is Clara Mattei.
0:42I'm assistant professor of economics
0:44at The New School for Social Research.
0:46And my work focuses on the relation
0:50between economic theory and policy making.
0:53So, an interdisciplinary work
0:55that is both history of economic thought
0:58and economic history, as well as methodology of economics.
1:02So, austerity has been so widely successful
1:07in shaping our societies and how we think about our society.
1:12It has been fundamentally undetectable.
1:17It is so normalized that we rarely call it by name.
1:21But it actually informs all the common tropes
1:24of contemporary policy making,
1:26from the budget cuts, specifically in welfare cuts,
1:30such as public spending for schools,
1:34for universities, for healthcare, for housing,
1:38unemployment benefits, regressive taxation,
1:41so we constantly see cuts
1:44in the highest brackets or cuts in corporate taxes,
1:48and also hikes in the interest rates,
1:52which is, of course, something that we're seeing
1:54the Fed is undertaking at the present moment.
1:58What I try to do in my work
2:01is re-problematize austerity.
2:03Austerity is everywhere.
2:06It's all-encompassing in our lives.
2:08Yet, I don't think that scholars have thoroughly been able
2:13to pinpoint why austerity is so successful
2:17and so enduring in contemporary capitalism.
2:22I wrote this book that took many years
2:25and it's coming out with Chicago University Press
2:29beginning of November.
2:30The book is called "The Capital Order:
2:33How Economists Invented Austerity
2:36and Paved the Way to Fascism."
2:37What I tried to do in this book is rethink austerity,
2:41rethink it in fundamentally three ways.
2:44The first is to avoid considering austerity
2:48just as a matter of fiscal measures.
2:52So it's not just about cuts in the budget.
2:56It's something more.
2:58It's what I call the austerity trinity,
3:00which includes the mutual operation
3:06of fiscal policies, so, of course,
3:09both on the side of cutting and on the side of the income
3:12through regressive taxation,
3:14monetary policy, so, interest rates hikes,
3:19and industrial policies.
3:21And when I talk about industrial policies,
3:23what I fundamentally mean
3:25is the fact that there is a permanent attack
3:30on organized labor,
3:32which can be cutting union benefits,
3:37curtailing the role of the unions,
3:38but also, fundamentally securing wage flexibility
3:43and wage repression.
3:45So, this austerity trinity works in unison,
3:50and you cannot just focus on one aspect.
3:53Moreover, what I try to say is that austerity
3:55is actually not just policy.
3:57It's more.
3:58It's actually the amalgamation of policy and theory.
4:01And austerity is in fact very successful
4:03because it has a powerful set of theory backing it.
4:08So this is the first main claim, what austerity is.
4:10It's both policy, not just fiscal policy,
4:14and it's also theory.
4:15And theory and policy cannot be separable.
4:17Secondly, austerity is not the product
4:21of the so-called neo-liberal era of the 1970s.
4:26Austerity is actually quite more fundamental
4:29to the operation of capitalism.
4:31And its origin dates back to at least
4:35the beginning of the century,
4:36and my claim is that austerity finds its origins
4:40after the Great War, so after 1918.
4:44And it was a measure to react to a big crisis of capitalism.
4:51So austerity as the mainstay of capitalism,
4:54not just an exception, but quite the norm.
4:57And at this point,
4:58the third claim I make is that austerity
5:02is not just a matter of irrationality,
5:04of bad economic theory that thus informs a mistaken policy.
5:10And this is the reading of austerity
5:12that many Keynesians have,
5:15but I think it's very simplistic.
5:17Because it does not really get to why, then,
5:20does austerity persist?
5:22And to really fundamentally understand
5:24why austerity persists,
5:26we need to figure out its deeper logic.
5:30And this deeper logic
5:32is understandable if we think about austerity
5:35not as stabilizing economies necessarily, right.
5:40The reason why Mark Blyth calls austerity madness,
5:44it's because it has never really
5:46or very exceptionally achieved its stated goals
5:50of economic growth
5:52and debt repayment, right?
5:54So the tale of expansionary austerity
5:57is certainly one that economists espouse
6:00but has been often, actually,
6:03disproven by historical events.
6:06So, as I was saying,
6:07austerity is not necessarily successful
6:10in stabilizing economies,
6:13but it is successful in something deeper.
6:15And my bold claim in the book is that austerity
6:18was really never about the end goal
6:21of curtailing inflation and balanced budgets.
6:25These were means to a greater end,
6:27which is that of preserving the capital order.
6:30So austerity may not stabilize the economy,
6:34but stabilizes what is actually the precondition
6:39for any capital accumulation
6:41and any preservation of our socioeconomic system as a whole,
6:45which is capital.
6:48That comes from, that's the title's motivation
6:51is the capital order, what is the capital order?
6:54It is the idea that capital is not merely a commodity.
6:58So money invested to make more money.
7:02But it's actually presupposes
7:05a specific social relation of production,
7:09a specific class relation that requires stabilization.
7:14If you don't secure the preservation of this class relation
7:18that is at the foundation of economic growth
7:20under capitalism, then the system may be in crisis.
7:24So the book explores the origin of austerity
7:28because I believe that in order to understand the logic
7:31of austerity still today,
7:32you need to really go back.
7:34After the first World War,
7:37something unimaginable happened for the people living
7:40at that time.
7:41Capitalism was shaken at its very core.
7:45The pillars of capitalism,
7:47what guarantees capital accumulation,
7:50which is private property of the means of production
7:53and wage relations,
7:55so capital as a class relation, were shaken.
7:59Why were they shaken?
8:00Well, because there had been a massive shock
8:04in the relation between the state and the market.
8:08The Great War, the first World War,
8:12was a moment in which the state,
8:14in order to guarantee economic victory,
8:17had to cross the natural boundaries
8:22of what it was normally meant to do.
8:25The state became the main employer,
8:27the main producer, and actually the main regulator
8:31of the labor force.
8:33In this way,
8:35what used to be understood as natural givens,
8:40private property of the means of production
8:43and wage relations,
8:44were all of a sudden re-politicized.
8:46What do I mean by this?
8:48Seems like a big word, but it's actually quite simple.
8:50Workers and the majority of citizens in Europe,
8:55and I focus specifically on Britain and Italy,
8:58and I will tell you why more later,
9:00started realizing that things could be different.
9:03We could be living in a different socioeconomic order.
9:08Capitalism was not a natural given.
9:11It was a specific classist political choice
9:14in which the state was directly visibly intervening
9:19to coerce the workers into greater exploitation
9:23in order to win the war.
9:25So after the first World War,
9:27and this is what I discuss in the first part of the book,
9:30the crisis of capitalism,
9:32this crisis was not just about an economic downturn,
9:35was something much more.
9:37It was about calls for economic democracy,
9:40calls to overcome capital as a class relation,
9:44calls to actually regain sovereignty as producers
9:50and fundamentally abolish the profit motive
9:54and the private property of the means of production.
9:57How did this happen?
9:58It happened in many ways.
9:59It happened through guild socialism,
10:02through worker council movements.
10:05I go through a whole spectrum of practical possibilities
10:09for change that were also informed
10:11by different economic theory.
10:13So Marxian economic theory
10:15that put at the center stage the worker.
10:18So what happens there?
10:19And this is, we get to the crux of the matter.
10:22In a moment in which capitalism was shaking,
10:25in which there was deep uncertainty for the future,
10:30the sense of contingency was everywhere,
10:32not just from the side of the workers,
10:33especially from the side of the bourgeoisie,
10:36who was really frightened on the news
10:39and on the press about the possible collapse
10:42of the socioeconomic order.
10:43And this is very clear also in Keynes' writing in 1919.
10:48This is when austerity is really born.
10:51Austerity is born as a tool of reaction
10:55to prevent the collapse of capitalism
10:59as a classist socioeconomic system.
11:01So, austerity is really a political project
11:08that was extremely successful
11:11in preventing, foreclosing alternatives to capitalism.
11:16And how did that happen?
11:18Well, I reconstruct the first
11:21international financial conferences
11:23in Brussels and Genoa, 1919, 1922,
11:28in which experts, economists, for the first time,
11:32were called to advise states all over Europe
11:38and to tell them what was the true economic doctrine
11:41that should be implemented in order to prevent the collapse.
11:46And this is the big relationship
11:48between austerity and technocracy.
11:51Technocracy, meaning the rule of economic experts
11:54in advising governments, but more than this,
11:58technocracy as an epistemic stance
12:02by which experts can come up with theories
12:08that are above classist, that are neutral, objective,
12:12without any sort of bias,
12:14and thus, the expert as the guide to the solution
12:21and to the prosperity of all.
12:22So, very much apolitical theory, and of course,
12:26this was grounded in the growing marginalist framework.
12:30The original of neoclassical economics
12:32that still dominates to this day is really dated
12:35at the end of the 19th century,
12:38but was really kind of spreading
12:41and becoming ingrained
12:45in the years of the birth of austerity,
12:48in the 1920s.
12:50So it is at this point that you see how economic theory
12:55understood as a framework that expels class conflict,
13:01expels the worker as the source of value,
13:06and instead tells us that the economy is made up
13:09of individuals that are not in conflict with one another,
13:14but they're actually in harmony,
13:16and that it's no longer the worker who counts,
13:19but it's the entrepreneur who is the driver
13:21of the economic machine,
13:23it's there that this economic theory
13:26that seems so apolitical is actually justifying
13:30the most classist set of economic policies of all.
13:35And again, we need this theory
13:38that in its classless guise
13:40is able to justify policies, the trinity,
13:45the austerity trinity of fiscal, monetary,
13:48industrial austerity, that served to crush
13:51the voice of the workers in a very material way.
13:55So austerity as a tool,
13:58as a political project,
14:00that is at once about constructing consensus
14:05for the capitalist order
14:09through mainstream economic theory
14:12that justifies the priority of the saving investing elite
14:17as the real engine of the economic machine,
14:22that thus should be incentivized,
14:25and austerity as coercion through these policies
14:28that in fact, austerity policies are nothing but
14:33the shifting of resources from the majority
14:37that at that time was empowered.
14:40Wage shares were very high after the war.
14:43The Red Biennium, 1918 to 1920,
14:46in which the workers were raising their voices,
14:48not just for higher wages,
14:50but for a really different socioeconomic order.
14:54Austerity serves to disempower them materially speaking.
15:00And how does this happen?
15:02Well, either directly through policies
15:05that actually make strikes illegal, such as in Italy,
15:09and curtail wages, and this is what happens
15:12under Mussolini's Italy, but also indirectly
15:16by creating an economic downturn.
15:19So, monetary deflation,
15:21what we see actually being the main policy agenda now
15:25of the Fed, monetary deflation together with budget cuts
15:30have also, the indirect effect,
15:32that very important indirect effect
15:33of slowing down the economy,
15:35creating higher unemployment,
15:38which, of course, kills the bargaining power of the workers
15:41and thus, subordinates them in a coercive way
15:44into accepting the capital order.
15:47So we see how there's a direct and indirect shift
15:50of resources and of political power
15:53from the majority to the minority.
15:56And in this, austerity is successful
15:59and it has, what I tried to show in the book is that,
16:02the origin story only really makes more explicit,
16:06given that it is a moment in which everyone recognizes
16:09class conflict as the driving feature
16:12of the historical moment,
16:14makes only more explicit what is more nuanced
16:19and hidden today.
16:21So this is why we need to take history seriously
16:25is that if you understand the moment
16:27in which austerity was born,
16:29you can really figure out its logic.
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